Food price instability in developing countries. The need for public intervention to stabilise prices by Galtier, Franck
TThe food crises which affected the Sahel in 2005 and the international markets in 2008 have placed the issue of food price instability at the very 
forefront of discussion. The urban riots which broke out in about forty 
developing countries as a result of the sharp price increases of 2008 empha-
sised the fact that this instability can have serious consequences for food 
security both in the short term – consumer access to food – and in the long 
term – incentive to producers to invest and increase production. Numerous 
experts predict that this instability will be long-lasting, both on the interna-
tional markets and in developing countries. What, then, should be done?
The quest for a miracle instrument 
Since the inter-war years, the search for a solution had centred on price stabilisation 
through the public authorities, in particular by creating stocks. During the 1980s, 
economic liberalisation led to the emphasis being placed on risk management through 
private instruments (futures markets, options), complemented by safety nets intended 
for vulnerable households. These approaches did not achieve the desired results. 
A comprehensive examination of all the potential instruments for handling food 
price instability was necessary, resulting in four categories being identified according 
to the objective – to stabilise prices or manage price risk – and the method of 
governance – market-based or public.
The four categories of price instability management instruments
	 Objective	 Stabilise	prices	 Manage	price	risk	 	
	 	 	
Governance	
Market-based “A-instruments” “B-instruments”
Public	 “C-instruments” “D-instruments”
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The central tenet of A-instruments is that the arbitrages of market actors cause prices to 
be homogenised over time, in space and between products, which in principle reduces 
their instability. These instruments are intended to modernise production and trade 
structures with a view to facilitating arbitrages between crops, production techniques, 
locations and times of purchase and sale. They include the construction of storage 
infrastructures, the development of quality standards and the creation of warehouse 
receipt systems or exchanges.
Also founded on the market, B-instruments are intended to limit the effects of price 
instability on income by enabling economic actors to cover themselves against the 
risks linked to price variability (futures contracts, call or put options) and harvests (crop 
insurances, weather index insurances).
C- and D- instruments fall into the field of public intervention. C-instruments aim to 
stabilise prices by controlling production (input subsidies), regulating imports and 
exports (variable taxes and subsidies, quotas, bans) and using public stocks. 
D-instruments enable household incomes to be supported during periods of high prices. 
They are based on transfers targeting poor or vulnerable households and vary according 
to the nature of the good transferred (money, vouchers, food or even inputs), the level of 
cover (donation or subsidy) and the existence of a counterpart (generally labour).
Managing risks without affecting prices:  
a well-established doctrine…  
until the crises of the current decade  
Since the 1980s, the predominant idea has been that it is preferable to manage risks 
without affecting prices. The effects of price instability would be reduced by means 
of private instruments (crop insurance, futures markets and other B-instruments), 
complemented by safety nets intended for vulnerable populations (D-instruments). 
The doctrine is founded on two arguments. Stabilising agricultural prices would prevent 
prices from playing their role as a signal guiding production and trade behaviour and, 
by disconnecting prices from the level of production, it would deprive producers of the 
“natural insurance” provided by the negative correlation between the quantity harvested 
and the price (the worse the harvest, the higher the price and vice-versa, resulting in 
incomes being stabilised). 
This strategy has not stood the test of time. Private risk management instruments are still 
used only very rarely, despite initiatives aimed at promoting them vis-à-vis producers, 
traders and even the governments of developing countries. Moreover, the crisis which 
affected the Sahel in 2005 revealed that the safety nets did not succeed in checking the 
deterioration of the nutritional situation of vulnerable households.  
The three 
causes of food 
price instability 
in developing 
countries
Most analysts implicitly take it for granted that 
price instability is a result of natural hazards. 
Some works have nevertheless highlighted the 
importance of imported instability (Byerlee et 
al., 2005) and endogenous instability (Bous-
sard et al., 2006).  
Natural instability: price fluctuations are 
linked to variations in domestic supply result-
ing from natural hazards affecting production 
(rains, locusts etc.). 
Imported instability:	the	variability of inter-
national prices, exchange rates and transport 
costs give rise to price instability on the do-
mestic market.
Endogenous instability: price variability is 
caused by the functioning of the market itself. 
Actors make decisions – concerning produc-
tion, investment and storage – by anticipating 
the price levels. If they base their expecta-
tions on past price changes, a vicious circle 
may arise: the instability of expectations 
leads to price instability, which exacerbates 
the instability of expectations. This concerns, 
in particular, cobweb phenomena, specula-
tive bubbles or panic movements. Prices can 
therefore vary independently of the “funda-
mentals”. 
Finally, the crisis of 2008 was born on the international markets and was in large part 
the result of speculative and panic movements on the physical market. It demonstrates 
the importance of imported instability and endogenous instability which, according 
to most experts, will play a major role in the coming years. At the same time, the 
arguments against price stabilisation do not hold for these two types of instability. 
In the event of endogenous instability, not only do prices not convey the appropriate 
information to the economic actors, they also mislead them. By reducing the endogenous 
component of instability, stabilisation policies would enable prices to reflect more 
faithfully the scarcity or abundance of goods, thereby playing their role of a source of 
information more effectively.
In situations of imported instability, the domestic price depends on the international 
price and the exchange rate and not on the harvests within the country concerned. 
Moreover, even in cases of natural instability, the negative correlation between prices 
and harvest works against farmers whose production is in deficit: when the harvest is 
poor and the prices are therefore high, these farmers must buy large quantities to feed 
their family. Furthermore, in certain countries, a large proportion of the producers are 
in deficit (approx. 60% in Kenya and Ethiopia). 
The new paradigm:  
stabilising prices to modernise agriculture
In addition to its consequences on access to food for poor households, food price 
instability also affects the capacity of agricultural systems to modernise, a modernisation 
which is now seen as a necessary step in the process of economic development. 
The modernisation of farms and markets relies on the investments of producers and 
traders. These are nevertheless risk averse and only invest if prices are not too unstable. 
Historically speaking, green revolutions have only occurred in situations of relative 
price stability. 
The stabilisation of food prices must therefore be seen from a long-term point of view 
as a condition of development. 
Which instruments should be adopted? The performance of the instruments depends 
on the causes of the instability: the same instrument may have a stabilising effect, a 
destabilising effect or no effect at all depending on the type of instability. For example, 
the development of transport infrastructures reduces price instability if it is natural 
(production surpluses and deficits in different zones are more able to offset one another), 
while it may increase it if the instability is endogenous (the slightest rumour leading to 
massive movements of stocks). It is therefore essential to design stabilisation policies 
suited to each cause of instability. 
In the case of natural instability, the solution involves attacking the problem “at its root” 
by modernising the production and trade structures for food products. The modernisation 
of farms makes production less sensitive to natural hazards (irrigation, pest management 
etc.) and more reactive to price movements. Modernising the markets allows production 
deficits and surpluses to be offset between zones (by means of trade) and between years 
(by means of storage). Nevertheless, this modernisation, which requires investment 
from private actors, is hampered by price instability. Public intervention intended to 
have a stabilising effect – use of public stocks, border controls – is therefore necessary 
to break this vicious circle.
If the instability is endogenous, public intervention may be necessary to calm the 
speculation fever on the markets. This may involve recourse to the international market 
(by removing the taxes on importations or even by subsidising them) or the use of a 
public stock. 
Choosing  
instruments  
according  
to the causes  
of price instability.
If the instability is imported, two levels of action can be envisaged: the international 
level and the national or regional level. The stabilisation of international prices could 
be achieved by the regulation of futures markets (with a view to reducing speculative 
bubbles), an interdiction on export bans or the implementation of international 
coordination with a view to increasing physical stocks. To stabilise prices at the national 
or regional level, border controls are necessary. Variable taxes on imports are the tool 
best suited to offsetting the effect of international price variations. However, recourse 
to these taxes is severely restricted by the World Trade Organisation (special safeguard 
clause), hence the need to relax the conditions of use for these taxes in the case of food 
products imported by developing countries. 
In light of this, some form of public intervention intended to bring about a stabilising 
effect (C-instruments) is necessary, irrespective of the cause of the price instability. To 
enable actors to improve their forecasts and risks to be reduced, the interventions must 
be foreseeable and therefore realistic, transparent and credible. 
If they wish to encourage the modernisation of their agricultural systems, the governments 
of developing countries should develop a price stabilisation strategy combining the 
four categories of instrument. This is a global objective which runs counter to the 
predominant doctrine, hence the need to mobilise the international community and to 
define new rules.
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